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511 
THE NUREMBERG ROLES OF 
JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON  
JOHN Q. BARRETT∗ 
It is an honor to be at this conference, and especially on this panel, with 
heroes. “Heroes” is not too strong a word. My friends Whitney Harris, 
Henry King and Benjamin Ferencz, who are present here, and other senior 
Nuremberg prosecutors such as Justice Benjamin Kaplan and Professor 
Bernard Meltzer who are not at this conference, are among my own 
heroes, but that is a personal point. Their general, permanent significance 
includes the fact that they are heroes of the law for what they did sixty 
years ago and have done ever since to develop the law and legacy of 
Nuremberg. 
I will redefine my topic a little bit. The program of this Nuremberg 
conference states that I will be speaking about “The Crucial Role of 
Robert H. Jackson.” In fact, there were multiple Jackson roles at 
Nuremberg—many, many roles and moments were encompassed in the 
undertaking that has come to be so significant historically that the primary, 
global meaning of the word “Nuremberg” today is, and probably always 
will be, the 1945–46 international trial of the principal surviving Nazi 
criminals.1 
Justice Jackson’s Nuremberg was over 15 months of full time 
involvement in an unprecedented, post-World War, two continent, five 
major world capital,2 wreckage-strewn, military occupied, twenty-plus 
nation, alliance-based, alliance fraying, four language, multi-million page, 
prisoner-inundated, debris- and body- and victim-surrounded, cold, hungry 
and unsafe, Nazi-fearing, Germany-fearing, World War III-fearing, fact 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, New York City, and Elizabeth S. 
Lenna Fellow, Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, New York (www.roberthjackson.org). This 
article grows out of my September 30, 2006, lecture at Washington University’s “Judgment at 
Nuremberg” conference. I am very grateful to Professors Leila Sadat, John Haley, Larry May and their 
Washington University faculty colleagues; to the University’s Whitney R. Harris Institute for Global 
Legal Studies, especially Linda McClain; and to the co-sponsoring institutions for their work on this 
extraordinary conference and commemoration. I thank my friends Whitney and Anna Harris for their 
special, generous and inspiring friendship. I also thank Professor Alice Kaplan for information about 
her father, Nuremberg prosecutor Sidney J. Kaplan; Professor Carol Needham for accurate St. Louis 
University data; and Richard C. Spatola for excellent research assistance.  
 1. One demonstration of this reality was Professor Cherif Bassiouni’s powerful intonation, at 
the start of these conference proceedings, of the word “Nuremberg” in multiple languages and national 
accents. 
 2. I refer to Washington, London, Moscow, Paris and Berlin. Perhaps Rome also belongs on 
this list. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 511 Barrett book pages.doc10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
512 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:511 
 
 
 
 
finding, institution creating, law building, crime defining, criminal guilt 
proving, punishment imposing and historical record publishing human 
endeavor. Given all of that, to understand “Nuremberg”—Jackson’s 
Nuremberg roles and the 1945–46 proceedings before the International 
Military Tribunal (“IMT”)—really requires one to look at Nuremberg not 
merely as a sixty-year-old finished product, preserved in the London 
conference record,3 in forty-two volumes of trial transcripts,4 in ten 
volumes of trial briefs, documentary exhibits and interrogation 
transcripts,5 and in the IMT’s judgment,6 all of which sit on library shelves 
throughout the world and much of which is available in virtual form on the 
Internet.7 History should see and remember Nuremberg from the front 
end: as it unfolded, and as Justice Jackson unfolded it; as something that 
was far from easy or foregone; and as something that in many ways could 
have turned out very differently. 
This sense of the contingency of Nuremberg is captured in many 
moments. One that I like very much is a paragraph that United States 
Coast Guard Reserve Commander Sidney J. Kaplan, a senior attorney on 
Justice Jackson’s United States prosecutorial staff, wrote from Nuremberg 
to his wife Lena, who then was at their home in Minneapolis with their 
one-year-old daughter, Hattie, on the evening of Monday, November 19, 
1945: 
Lena dearest, 
 Here we are on the eve of the opening of the second most 
important trial in the history of the world (No. 1: the trial of Jesus 
Christ). Tomorrow morning the trial opens. And believe me, the 
prosecution is utterly, completely, hopelessly, unprepared. Jackson 
 
 
 3. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY 
TRIALS, LONDON, 1945 (PUBLICATION 3080, RELEASED FEB. 1949). 
 4. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, vols. I–XLII (1947–49) available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm#proc (known informally as “the blue series” or “the 
blue set”). 
 5. See OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS 
CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, vols. I–VIII, Supp. A and Supp. B (1946–48) 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm#docs (known informally as “the red 
series” or “the red set”). 
 6. See OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS 
CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT (1947) available at 
http://www.historiography.project.com/nca/index.html. 
 7. See, e.g., Yale Law School’s Avalon Project, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ imt/imt.htm 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007). 
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will deliver a sensational opening statement—and from that point 
on we’re in the soup.8 
Nuremberg was about that soup, and about flailing in it, and about 
managing to swim well enough not to drown in it, and thus about 
accomplishing what we are here commemorating today. Nuremberg was 
all of the dimensions that I have mentioned, including many, many people, 
and it is an honor to be with some of them here at Washington University 
School of Law. At the top, however, Nuremberg was Robert H. Jackson—
its course, its accomplishments and thus its legacy bear too distinctly the 
qualities and imprint of Jackson himself as Nuremberg’s distinctly gifted, 
and distinctly human, architect, chief prosecutor and leading figure to 
overlook this personal identification. (Someone else, to be sure, could 
have been assigned to do the job that became Jackson’s job and his 
“Nuremberg,” but frankly, in historical hindsight, I am hard pressed to 
think who among his contemporaries in the United States government or 
private bar had his combination of stature and skill, and whose 
performance thus might have allowed us to be here commemorating 
anything like the Nuremberg we know historically.) Accordingly, this 
lecture will cover, in an utterly summary fashion I assure you, the 
background of Robert H. Jackson and then the story of “Nuremberg,” 
which is Jackson’s Nuremberg. 
I. JACKSON 
Robert H. Jackson’s life is an American story like few others. He was 
born in 1892 in a family farmhouse in northwestern Pennsylvania.9 He 
spent his early years with animals, on horseback, in fields and woods, and 
on mountains. His education came in small town public schools in 
southwestern New York State, in his own reading, debating and public 
speaking, and in the friendships, mentoring and explicit tutoring that he 
received from special teachers who knew and loved words, theory, 
literature, economics, law, government and history. Jackson’s higher 
education included no college education whatsoever and only one year of 
law school.10 He became a lawyer, after training primarily as an apprentice 
 
 
 8. Sidney J. Kaplan to Leonore (Lena) Kaplan, Nov. 19, 1945. See generally ALICE KAPLAN, 
FRENCH LESSONS: A MEMOIR (1993) (written by their younger daughter). 
 9. John Q. Barrett, Albany in the Life Trajectory of Robert H. Jackson, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 513 
(2005). 
 10. Jackson’s Early Life and Career, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-
1-1/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). 
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in a two-man law office in Jamestown, New York, in 1913 when he was 
twenty-one years old.11 Jackson then spent twenty years in private practice 
based in western New York State, rising to become an accomplished trial 
and appellate lawyer,12 a city lawyer, a corporate lawyer and counselor, a 
member of the American Law Institute, and, in 1934, national chairman of 
the American Bar Association’s Conference of Bar Association Delegates, 
a predecessor of today’s ABA House of Delegates.13 
Robert Jackson’s life included, in addition to the law, involvements in 
local, state and national Democratic Party politics.14 When Jackson was 
eighteen or nineteen, he met Frank Roosevelt, a freshman state senator 
from Dutchess County, New York, who himself was twenty-eight or 
twenty-nine years old.15 At that time (1911), neither one of them could 
have imagined the heights that the other would reach. Of course it was this 
Roosevelt, who in those early years had a politically potent surname but 
not very much else suggesting destiny, who later became “Franklin,” and 
the governor of New York, and in 1933 the president of the United States, 
and in Jackson’s life the crucial political benefactor, promoter and 
personal friend.16 In 1934, President Roosevelt brought Jackson to 
Washington, where he was nominated and confirmed to serve in a series of 
prominent, increasingly senior executive branch positions: in 1934, as 
Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Treasury Department;17 
in 1936, as Assistant Attorney General heading the Tax Division in the 
Department of Justice;18 in 1937, as Assistant Attorney General heading 
the Antitrust Division;19 in 1938, as Solicitor General of the United 
 
 
 11.  Barrett, supra note 9, at 513. 
 12. John Q. Barrett, Robert H. Jackson’s Oral Arguments before the New York Court of Appeals, 
3 HIST. SOC’Y. OF THE CTS. OF THE ST. OF N.Y. NEWSL. 3 (Spring/Summer 2005). 
 13. See Robert Hartley, Eighteenth Annual Meeting of Conference of Bar Association Delegates, 
19 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 669, 676 (1933) (reporting Jackson’s ascent to the chairmanship); Bar’s Aid 
Pledged in War on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1933, at 15 (same). In August 1936, the American 
Bar Association changed its structure, abolishing the twenty year old Conference of Bar Association 
Delegates and creating a new, more powerful and more democratically representative House of 
Delegates to be its successor. See E. Smythe Gambrell, Conference of Bar Association Delegates Ends 
Work—Names In Its Book of Gold, 22 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 721 (1936); William L. Ransom, Questions 
and Objections to the Pending Plan Answered, 22 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 452, 457 (1936). 
 14. Jackson’s Government Service, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-2-
2/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).  
 15. See Jackson’s Early Life and Career, supra note 10.  
 16. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). 
 17. See Jackson’s Government Service, supra note 14.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
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States;20 in 1940, as Attorney General of the United States;21 and in the 
summer of 1941, as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.22 
Although few résumés report a comparable ascent in public life, 
Jackson’s government job titles actually understate the substance of his 
work. He was, ahead of each of those titles, a figure in the inner, inner 
circles of Roosevelt’s New Deal, an eloquent and successful lawyer and 
leader in high profile battles, a leading voice and, in time, a national 
headline name. In 1935, for example, Jackson led the successful civil tax 
fraud prosecution of Andrew W. Mellon, the former Secretary of the 
Treasury.23 As Solicitor General beginning in 1938, Jackson built a 
stellar—really an unsurpassed—record and reputation while winning, in a 
Supreme Court that had changed course, the constitutionality of the New 
Deal.24 Jackson became a prominent visitor and speaker in cities and 
venues across the country and a renowned national radio voice. He was 
known generally as FDR’s trusted, supremely capable, if perhaps a bit 
radical, young lieutenant. Jackson at times was understood to be, and 
discussed widely as, FDR’s favorite to succeed him as president when his 
second term would conclude in January 1941. Indeed, Jackson probably 
would have been the New Dealers’ presidential torch bearer in 1940—
whether the Democratic Party barons and convention delegates would 
have nominated Jackson is a separate, and harder, issue for speculation—
had FDR decided not to seek a third term. 
In the summer of 1941, Jackson became an associate justice and the 
Supreme Court’s distinctively dazzling writer. During the next years, it 
was widely believed and reported that President Roosevelt intended to 
make Jackson the next chief justice of the United States. In 1945 and into 
1946, it was believed by many, including Jackson’s friend Harry Truman, 
who had become the new president that spring, that Jackson was the 
person uniquely qualified to be president of the United States and perhaps 
was still heading for that destination even as he served as the president’s 
appointed chief prosecutor at Nuremberg.25 
 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. See generally E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Robert H. Jackson: “Solicitor General for Life,” in 
JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY: 1992 Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society 75; 
(The Supreme Court Historical Society 1992); Victoria A. Graffeo, Robert H. Jackson: His Years as a 
Public Servant “Learned in the Law,” 68 ALBANY L. REV. 539, 542–45 (2005). 
 25. See GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 226–26 & 453 n.3 
(Simon and Schuster 1977) (describing President Truman’s spring 1946 statement to his aide Clark 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. JACKSON’S NUREMBERG 
The foregoing summary is a glimpse of Robert H. Jackson, the person 
and the public figure. Jackson met his moment, and he earned a large 
measure of his significant place in history, in the year-plus that he devoted 
to the Nuremberg Trials that included, in him and for him, many complex, 
defining facets: 
First, Jackson personified Nuremberg’s importance. The decision to 
send him to prosecute Nazi war criminals was a Roosevelt concept that 
became a Truman decision. With no slight intended to our host 
Washington University’s former law dean and later Jackson’s Supreme 
Court colleague Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, whose portrait looks down 
from the wall of the Anheuser-Busch Hall courtroom in which these 
conference proceedings are occurring, Jackson in the spring of 1945 was 
not merely one of nine Supreme Court justices. He was, even among his 
colleagues on one of the most talented Supreme Courts ever, a figure of 
distinctly high national and international reputation and experience. As a 
matter of branding, President Truman’s decision to appoint Jackson to 
prosecute Nazi war criminals was a strong statement indicating how 
seriously the United States took the prosecutions. It prompted the British, 
the Soviets and the French to appoint counterpart chief counsel of 
capability, high rank and sufficient authority to represent their nations. 
Second, Jackson also brought relevant experience to the task. His past 
included not merely the varied and relevant work of litigator, senior 
government official, foreign traveler and, in spots, international diplomat, 
but work in policy positions, especially during his eighteen months as 
Attorney General when the United States was preparing for and moving 
toward military involvement in the European war. His experience as 
Attorney General included literally the theoretical foundation of what was 
to become the core criminal law concept of Nuremberg: that Germany and 
its leaders had waged an illegal war of aggression. That perspective, with a 
thorough supporting analysis, was the basis of the Jackson-approved legal 
theory for President Roosevelt’s assistance to Great Britain, beginning in 
late summer 1940, by providing United States destroyers, our neutrality 
laws and other domestic legal restrictions notwithstanding.26 The same 
factual and legal analysis led to Lend-Lease legislation and assistance to 
Great Britain and then to the Soviet Union beginning in 1941. Jackson’s 
 
 
Clifford that Justice Jackson, who then was serving as chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, was the 
“one man . . . whose experience and talents seemed to make him presidential timber”). 
 26. See JACKSON, supra note 16, at 81–103. 
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March 1941 speech to the lawyers of the Western hemisphere, delivered in 
Havana, Cuba, after he and FDR had gone over it together on a 
presidential yacht offshore, is in many respects the first draft of the 
London Agreement and IMT Charter of August 1945 and the Nuremberg 
indictment that soon followed.27 
A third aspect of Jackson’s Nuremberg was personal ambition—he 
wanted this job. In a sense it was his war service. He went on the Supreme 
Court in July 1941 and, within months, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor 
changed everything. Jackson volunteered to leave the Court repeatedly, 
but the President told him to stay put—in FDR’s view, Jackson was not a 
warrior and he was being groomed through judicial service for his later 
elevation to chief justice, and each of those reasons argued against 
bringing him back from the Court into the executive branch during the war 
years. The President also recognized, however, as he saw from an early 
date the possible legal tasks that would follow the War, that Jackson was 
“particularly qualified” to do them28—and, in 1945, that promised work 
became Nuremberg. The presidential assignment to prosecute Nazis also 
was, for Jackson, a trial separation from the Supreme Court. He was 
unhappy there in 1944 and early 1945, primarily because some of his 
colleagues had turned out to be not the principled, apolitical types he 
thought justices should be. President Truman’s request that Jackson 
prosecute leading Nazis while on leave from the Court thus offered him 
not only a vital and challenging task but, in some senses, a welcome 
professional respite. (During the course of the trial, Truman repeatedly 
declined Jackson’s offers to resign from the Supreme Court, so his leave 
never turned into a permanent departure.) 
Jackson’s Nuremberg also involved, however, self-sacrifice. He got to 
be the man of Nuremberg, to be sure, but he knew it would cost him 
dearly. Jackson recognized that leaving North America and the identity of 
judicial office to take on an enormously complex international diplomatic 
and legal project that could fail probably would cost him the chief 
justiceship, and in 1946 it did. Jackson also viewed the decision to 
prosecute the Nazis as requiring him never to seek political office 
thereafter, and he made that serious choice without hesitation. He also 
 
 
 27. This speech, which the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba read to the Inter-American Bar Association 
for Jackson because rough seas prevented him from traveling from FDR’s yacht to Havana to deliver it 
in person, was published widely. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Address before the Inter-Am. Bar 
Ass’n: International Order, 27 A.B.A. J. 275 (1941); Address of Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General 
of the United States, International Bar Association, Havana, Cuba, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (1941). 
 28. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 107. 
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thought that the workload and hardships of this assignment might shorten 
his life, and probably they did. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg assignment personified a commitment to the path 
of law, not force. As he sketched it early on, the Allies at the end of the 
war had three options in dealing with the defeated Nazis. At one extreme, 
the victors had power to line up and shoot as many of the vanquished as 
they preferred. At the other extreme, the victors could accept salutes from 
the defeated and watch them retreat into their territory. Between these two 
extremes came Nuremberg: an effort, for the first time, to bring law, at the 
level of actual enforcement and individual accountability, to the wreckage 
of war. Jackson believed in this law path and defined it as his condition for 
taking the job. He got the job on these terms because lawful individual 
accountability was President Truman’s vision as well. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg also was characterized, particularly at the start, 
by innocence and foolish optimism: he thought that this could be a 
summer job. To be fair, he was recruited on representations (which turned 
out to be false) that there were assembled cases ready to prosecute. The 
calendar indicates, strikingly, which “cases” those were—President 
Truman announced Jackson’s appointment on May 2, 1945, but when their 
private conversations about this task actually began eight days earlier, the 
prospective lead defendant was Adolf Hitler, perhaps to be joined in the 
dock by Benito Mussolini, Josef Goebbels, Martin Bormann, Heinrich 
Himmler and Hermann Goering. They were the perpetrators who Jackson 
thought he could prosecute in an international trial, start to finish, between 
May and the first Monday in October of 1945. 
Another defining aspect of Jackson’s Nuremberg thus was 
recalibration, almost on a daily basis. The initial vision of prosecuting 
Hitler and a few other select, premier culpable defendants was succeeded 
by a plan to prosecute figures who were in many senses secondary. The 
Nuremberg defendants tried before the IMT were chosen because they 
represented slices of Nazi Germany—each individual defendant was 
chosen for prosecution because he represented a sector of Nazi power, and 
the defendant organizations that were prosecuted were pursued in the 
belief that establishing in a first trial the guilt of these entities would, 
through such verdicts, permit efficient subsequent prosecutions of culpable 
organization members. Prosecutor staff documents put actual, and 
somewhat mind-boggling, numbers on this proposed undertaking. In one 
such document, dating from January 1946, the number at the first tier of 
potential culpability was one: the Fuehrer. The second tier, Reich 
leadership, jumped to 1,000. Gauleiters and staff numbered 4,000 more. 
Circle leaders were an additional 21,000. Group leaders were 2,000 more. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/5
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Then came cell leaders, numbering almost 60,000 others, followed by 
block leaders numbering more than 300,000 others. Those persons, 
totaling 463,048, were the criminals to be prosecuted. And who would be 
spared prosecution? The spared would include 400,000 lesser members of 
the Nazi Party leadership, about 4,000,000 Party members, and more than 
40 million additional Party voters, along with the surviving segments of 
the 30 million others who had been German citizens in 1939—a total of 
about 79 million Germans would not be prosecuted.29 This all was 
determined, fitfully and over months and years, to be foolishness—
massive prosecution never happened. 
Another aspect of Jackson’s Nuremberg was his voice, which 
articulated eloquently and effectively the legal vision, the factual record 
and the prosecutorial position. Jackson’s Nuremberg trial work is 
remembered most widely for his opening and closing statements, which 
deserve separate mention below. His public articulation of Nuremberg 
itself actually began in June 1945 when he wrote and released a report to 
the President that was the blueprint for everything that followed. This 
report was a beautiful, sparkling document that came from Jackson’s mind 
and pen. It was published in newspapers across the United States and 
caused a flood of lawyers to seek jobs from Jackson. It also, more 
substantively, did much to bring the British on board with the United 
States’ vision going into negotiations with their French and Soviet allies. 
Jackson’s job, no turnkey operation, turned out to require, at the start, 
almost two months of intense international diplomacy. At London, the 
Allied nations conferred, drafted, debated and struggled to agree on a 
substantive plan to prosecute Nazi war criminals, but after weeks, coming 
from quite different legal systems and political perspectives, they 
remained far from agreement. In late July 1945, Jackson traveled from 
London to Potsdam in Allied-occupied Germany, just outside of Berlin, 
where he joined high level meetings with United States decision makers 
who were there for the “Big Three” conference (and who, in these 
meetings at least, interestingly included Secretary of State James F. 
 
 
 29. A chart containing these data, which was prepared in January 1946 by or under the 
supervision of Major Warren Farr, a lawyer on Jackson’s staff, is preserved in Jackson’s personal files 
(the so-called “Lindenstrasse Files”) in the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”), 
Entry 52, Box 5, College Park, MD, in a folder that he hand-captioned “Facts as to Organizational 
Criminality.” See generally Memorandum from Maj. Warren F. Farr to Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
(Jan. 4, 1945 [sic—1946]) (distinguishing the total number of Germans who might have been treated 
as implicated in the conspiracy that then was being prosecuted as Count One before the IMT from the 
number of Germans who actually were being prosecuted as part of the NSDAP Leadership Corps, and 
reporting to Jackson that an illustrative chart—the document cited here and described in the text—was 
being prepared). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 511 Barrett book pages.doc10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
520 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:511 
 
 
 
 
Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, senior legal adviser 
Charles Fahy and various generals, but not President Truman). They 
reiterated to Jackson the blank check nature of his power as United States 
chief of counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals: he had 
discretion to insist on any legal arrangements he thought necessary, even if 
his uncompromising positions could blow up the London conference 
should the French and Soviets not recede from disagreeing. Such a 
breakdown would have forced each nation to prosecute the particular 
German war criminals it had in its own custody and, in effect, might well 
have marked the end of the Allies more generally. Jackson, thus armed and 
also burdened with authority and complete discretion, returned from 
Potsdam to London, delivered various ultimata and, within days, obtained 
Allied agreement to key United States positions on procedures he thought 
central to a lawful trial process. 
The August 8, 1945, London Agreement and Charter are the next facet 
of Jackson’s Nuremberg. The Charter is a seminal document of modern 
international law: it defines crimes, creates the independent judiciary of 
the IMT and establishes the due process of the Nuremberg trial, including 
its commitments to proceeding in public, to a prosecution burden of proof, 
and to defendants’ rights to counsel and defense resources. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg tasks also included staffing the incredibly 
talented group of lawyers and other personnel with whom he surrounded 
himself during this project. They included his own son William Eldred 
Jackson, age twenty-six, who served as his father’s executive assistant. 
The staff early on recruited a Los Angeles lawyer and Naval officer, 
Whitney Robson Harris, who was with the OSS in London, very talented 
and in possession of evidence of German war crimes.30 The United States 
team at Nuremberg included a young lawyer from St. Louis, Edgar G. 
Boedeker.31 It did not include Mark Eagleton, another St. Louis lawyer 
whose family name has remained prominent—Jackson declined to add 
Eagleton to his staff, notwithstanding Missouri political leader, 
presidential friend, Democratic National Committee chairman and 
 
 
 30. See generally John Q. Barrett, Postscript: Justice Robert H. Jackson on “My dear Whit,” 
Lectures (Spring 2002) (Whitney R. Harris Institute for Global Legal Studies) (on file at the 
Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, MO). 
 31. Edgar George Boedeker, a St. Louis native, graduated from St. Louis University School of 
Law in 1937. During World War II and after, he served in the Judge Advocate General’s Department 
of the U.S. Army. At Nuremberg, Captain Boedeker was part of a JAG team within the U.S. legal staff 
that prepared evidence for presentation to the Tribunal. He later served in the Missouri House of 
Representatives, was in private law practice and served as the city attorney of Clayton, Missouri. See 
Edgar G. Boedeker, Longtime Clayton City Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 2001, at B4 
(reporting his death at age 85). 
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Postmaster General Robert Hannegan getting former Supreme Court 
Justice James Byrnes to set up a meeting about Eagleton (who even was 
willing to work pro bono), because Jackson was convinced that Hannegan 
was looking only to advance Eagleton’s political career.32 Jackson’s 
Nuremberg team also had many excellent lawyers who did not stay for the 
duration of the trial—some were civilians who had signed on for a fixed 
period, and they left after fulfilling those commitments; others who were 
in active military service left Nuremberg when they had earned enough 
“points” to be discharged. Jackson, by contrast, had signed on for the 
international trial job and saw it through—as he once put it, he was not 
eligible to earn the points to leave early. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg included the Allied nation indictments in 
October 1945 of twenty-four individuals and six Nazi organizations. The 
indictment’s principal draftsman was United States lawyer Benjamin 
Kaplan; he returned to the U.S. from Nuremberg in December 1945, 
resumed private legal practice in New York and subsequently became an 
eminent professor and scholar at Harvard Law School and a distinguished 
jurist on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. One of the lawyers 
with whom he worked closely was Bernard Meltzer, who also prepared 
evidence of German concentration camps, presented in January 1946 the 
trial case against defendant Walther Funk, and later that year commenced 
his long career as a distinguished law professor at the University of 
Chicago. Other international and criminal law giants who played 
consulting roles in the indictment process included Professor Hersch 
Lauterpacht of Cambridge University and Professor Sheldon Glueck of 
Harvard Law School. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg also included the reality of living in and being a 
senior official in Allied-occupied Germany. He and his staff worked with 
 
 
 32. In the early 1950s, Jackson recalled that Hannegan had pushed for Mark Eagleton’s 
appointment as Jackson’s chief assistant because the prestige would help Eagleton, who was an 
important Hannegan political ally. See THE REMINISCENCES OF ROBERT H. JACKSON (Harlan B. 
Phillips ed., 1955) (available at Columbia Univ., Oral History Research Office); see also Robert H. 
Jackson diary entry, May 10, 1945 (available in Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. (“RHJL”), Box 95) (describing Byrnes’s telephone call about 
Hannegan’s desire to meet with Jackson to urge him to put Eagleton on Jackson’s staff); Letter from 
Robert H. Jackson to Mark D. Eagleton, May 14, 1945 (available in RHJL, Box 105, Folder 12) 
(acknowledging Hannegan’s communication of Eagleton’s offer to help Jackson but explaining that he 
is relying chiefly on government personnel who have been involved in working on war crimes 
materials); Letter from Mark D. Eagleton to Robert H. Jackson, May 21, 1945 (available in id.) 
(acknowledging Jackson’s letter and setting forth his extensive civil litigation experience and 
explaining his desire to serve); Letter from Secretary [Ruth M. Sternberg] to Mark D. Eagleton, May 
25, 1945 (available in id.) (acknowledging his May 21st letter, received in Jackson’s Supreme Court 
chambers while he was on his first trip to Europe as U.S. Chief of Counsel). 
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the occupation government on numerous issues, including so-called 
denazification. Jackson also had close working relationships and 
friendships with the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, with his successor General Joseph T. McNarney, with Judge 
Advocate General Edward C. Betts, and with General Lucius D. Clay of 
the occupation government, among others. In Germany, Jackson also met 
and worked closely with Colonel Charles Fairman, who was serving in the 
Judge Advocate General Division on leave from his position as a political 
science professor at Stanford University, headed General Betts’s 
international law branch in Frankfurt and supervised responsibility for war 
criminal prosecutions throughout the occupation theater.33 (Later, during 
two years (1953–55) that fell between his tenure at Stanford and his tenure 
on the faculty at Harvard Law School, Fairman was the Nagel Professor of 
Constitutional Law here at Washington University in St. Louis. He was an 
extremely significant figure in the development of United States 
constitutional law, thinking and scholarship.34) Jackson’s trial endeavor 
was one part of the occupation land and population problems that the 
United States was grappling with following Nazi Germany’s unconditional 
surrender, and he was enmeshed to some degree in every aspect of the 
occupation.  
 
 
 33. See, e.g., Letter from Charles Fairman to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Mar. 1, 1946 
(available in Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., 
Box 12): 
Before I left Germany, it was my privilege on numerous occasions to meet your wandering 
Brother [Justice Jackson]. I had many opportunities to observe what a very large contribution 
he had made to the operation of getting the war crimes trials started. I think particularly of his 
leadership and the influence of his character in the unbelievably difficult business of 
obtaining common action, quite aside from any technical legal matters. 
See also Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Charles Fairman, Mar. 13, 1950, reprinted in WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, XII HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 
CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, 713–15 (2006) (writing, in a letter 
about the constitutionality of racial segregation in schools in the United States, that “[y]ou [Fairman] 
and I [Jackson] have seen the terrible consequences of racial hatred in Germany” and thus “can have 
no sympathy with racial conceits which underlie segregation policies,” and noting that “[y]ou and I 
have seen that nothing promotes fascism as surely as a real and widespread popular fear of 
communism and ‘radicalism’”). 
 34. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights: 
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, vol. 6 (1971); 
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION 
AND REUNION, 1864–88, vol. 7 (1987); CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Supp. 1988). Following 
Jackson’s death in October 1954, Fairman wrote an assessment and tribute that focused on Jackson’s 
Supreme Court work. Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 
445 (1955). 
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The building and presenting of the prosecution case was another central 
aspect of Jackson’s Nuremberg. During the spring and summer of 1945, he 
made the fundamental decision that the case would be built primarily on 
captured German documents, not on memory and honesty-dependent 
testimony obtained by making deals with cooperating witnesses. The 
documentary approach made for a longer, duller trial and thus some press 
irritation and related external criticism, but it resulted in a record that was 
in the trial, and that is in history, unimpeachable. And of course what we 
know of Nazi depredations, both the crimes of individual perpetrators and 
the history of that regime, is based in that Nuremberg trial record. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg also included his trial voice, which lead the 
advocacy and was consistently, if not perfectly, effective. His November 
21, 1945, opening argument and his July 26, 1946, summation were spell-
binding in the courtroom and will always be remembered in history. 
Jackson also gave on February 28, 1946, an extensive and impressive, if 
today less-remembered, argument to the Tribunal on the criminality of the 
Nazi organizations that were being prosecuted and the legal theory of 
those cases. He cross-examined three defendants: Hermann Goering, with 
some low moments but also more effectiveness than the popular memory 
believes; Hjalmar Schacht, building a record that shines harsh light on his 
ultimate acquittal by the Tribunal; and Albert Speer, who Jackson may at 
times have treated too gently but at others questioned in ways that 
produced historically devastating admissions. Jackson also personally, and 
effectively, cross-examined leading defense witnesses, including former 
German air force General Karl Bodenschatz, former Field Marshal Erhard 
Milch, former German air force Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, former 
Prussian State Ministry secretary Paul Koerner and former German 
diplomat and intelligence officer Hans Bernd Gisevius, and Jackson 
outside of the courtroom interrogated and also supervised and tracked his 
staff’s interrogations of many former Nazis who were in Allied custody.35 
Jackson’s Nuremberg also included, at its core, a determination not to 
be about vengeance. The record obviously shows prosecutor Jackson 
working aggressively for many months to build cases, get them to trial and 
win convictions. It does not, however, include any Jackson argument for 
particular punishment for any defendant—he left those assessments and 
determinations to the Tribunal. Jackson believed personally that these 
defendants deserved enormous punishments and he, who personally 
 
 
 35. The memoir of Jackson’s Interrogation Division chief interpreter, who participated in many 
of these interrogations, is RICHARD W. SONNENFELDT, WITNESS TO NUREMBERG (Arcade Publishing 
2006).  
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opposed the death penalty, felt no qualms about the executions of ten 
criminals (nor Goering’s suicide) following their Nuremberg convictions. 
But Jackson, in not arguing punishment, was taking seriously the role 
distinctions—his own responsibilities as a trial prosecutor, and the 
Tribunal’s independence—that were part of his core concept of 
Nuremberg’s legality. 
Jackson’s Nuremberg involved, finally, seeing it through. He saw it 
through in the sense that he remained throughout the trial and then 
summed up on July 26, 1946, the evidence against the individual 
defendants. He then, in August 1946, came home to Washington and 
remained there into mid-September, preparing for the impending start of 
the new Supreme Court Term that would include extra work carried over 
from the 8-justice previous term that Jackson had missed entirely. But 
Jackson also saw Nuremberg through in the sense that he returned himself 
to face judgment day. 
Jackson returned to Nuremberg, for the last time, on Saturday, 
September 28, 1946. He returned with a delegation of trusted friends and 
former colleagues, including some whom he had with regret effectively 
fired in earlier stages of the prosecution project. When they arrived, they 
found that “Jackson’s” house (a private home, at Lindenstrasse 33 in 
Dambach, Fürth, which the United States occupation Army had seized 
from a German family in 1945 and held for a number of years) had been 
passed on since late July to his deputy, General Telford Taylor, who 
would be heading up the United States-only trials that would follow the 
IMT trial and constitute a second phase of Nuremberg. This meant that 
Jackson was, in a light sense, homeless. He went with his party to the large 
“VIP house” that the Allies were using, but it was largely filled with other 
VIPs who had arrived earlier; Jackson and his group found beds under its 
eaves, up in the attic. 
On September 30, 1946—sixty years ago—Jackson and his group 
traveled to the Palace of Justice. They sat through the Tribunal’s reading 
of its judgment, which must have been both gripping and, as it filled that 
full day and continued into the next, excruciating. On September 30th, 
Jackson heard the judgments on the legal validity of the crimes charged 
and the verdicts on the defendant organizations. On October 1st, he heard 
in the morning the verdicts on the individual defendants and, in the 
afternoon, the sentences imposed on the nineteen of twenty-two 
defendants who that morning had been found guilty. What Jackson heard 
in those judgments was corroborating vindication of his core thoughts and 
efforts during the preceding seventeen-month process: the crimes proven; 
the guilt established; and the acquittals that, although they stung in the 
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moment, came to embody in his later reflections very tangible proof of the 
fairness of the Nuremberg process. 
III. A JUDGMENT 
And so what are we to make of Justice Robert H. Jackson’s 
Nuremberg, which also was and is the Nuremberg of all who played 
constructive roles in the international trial sixty years ago? 
They won. 
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